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Abstract 
Using a transactions costs framework, we examine the impact of information and communication 
technologies (mobile phones and radios) use on market participation in developing country agricultural 
markets using a novel transaction-level data set of Ghanaian farmers. Our analysis of the choice of 
markets by farmers suggests that market information from a broader range of markets may not always 
induce farmers to sell in more distant markets; instead farmers may use broader market information to 
enhance their bargaining power in closer markets. Finally we find weak evidence on the impact of using 
mobile phones in attracting farm gate buyers. 
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I. Introduction 
An understanding of factors influencing market participation in developing countries is important for 
supporting the economic inclusion of remote farm households and in ultimately increasing their welfare. 
Market participation is crucial to economic growth and poverty reduction in rural areas in two ways. 
First, it allows farmers to trade surpluses of goods in which they hold a comparative advantage in 
production. Second, it enables larger scale production, reduction of fixed production costs, and 
enhanced use of technology which all together leads to more rapid total factor productivity growth. 
Ultimately, market access allows expansion in choice sets of farm households and thus higher levels of 
welfare for potential participants. This paper aims to better understand how transaction costs aﬀect 
marketing decisions of farmers in northern Ghana, and how the use of information communication 
technologies (ICTs) (namely, mobile phones and radios) impacts market participation behaviour. 
Rural markets are often imperfect and transaction costs can be so high that farmers are unable to 
participate in markets (de Janvry et al., 1991). The variable and volatile nature of transaction costs has 
challenged researchers attempting to assess their impact on marketing decisions. At the same time, in 
the past twenty years governments and aid agencies have recognised the importance of developing 
agricultural markets, investing in infrastructure and implementing policies to improve market 
participation of small-scale farmers. However, a large part of the trade in agricultural commodities in 
Sub-Saharan Africa takes place within social networks and depends on personal relationships. Thus, 
one of the challenges faced by policy makers has been to bring about a shift from personal exchanges 
to impersonal ones in order to widen the trade network (Platteau, 1994). From the other side, farm 
households have adopted a number of strategies in order to be able to participate in markets or expand 
the trade network, such as creating and participating in cooperatives where costs and risks associated 
with transactions are minimised (Fafchamps, 2004). In an environment where transport infrastructure 
is often ineﬃcient, a major obstacle to market participation is the scarcity of information exchange 
between the actors. The recent adoption of ICTs in rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa can potentially 
enhance the flow of information with direct benefits for farmers’ welfare. Better information can 
improve farmers’ bargaining position, reduce search costs, and give them the choice to travel to farther 
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markets if prices there are higher. In addition, farmers can improve allocation of production factors and 
be better informed about the optimum timing of sales. 
In this paper, we focus on the determinants that drive the farm household’s decision regarding the place 
of sale of farm produce. In investigating transaction costs, we focus on the effects of recent diﬀusion of 
ICTs in rural areas and their impact on search costs. We first investigate why some transactions occur 
at the farm gate and others at the marketplace. That requires modelling not only the farmers’ marketing 
behaviour, but also the role of itinerant farm gate buyers. Farm gate buyers play an important role in 
the agricultural marketing system of Ghana and many developing countries. Their role is to travel to 
the farm gate, buy the commodity and resell in markets farther from the production regions where they 
may derive larger profits. Often, they may buy after the harvest, and store the produce until prices at 
the market increase. However, small-scale farmers may decide to travel to the market if farm gate buyers 
are not available or if they expect a larger profit from a sale at the marketplace. In this case, they may 
have diﬀerent markets to choose from. Examining what drives the decision to travel to a farther market 
or sell at a nearer market is the second objective of this study. 
The current study encompasses two strands of research on market participation in agricultural markets: 
the first comprises studies devoted to investigating the role of transaction costs in market transactions; 
the second is a more recent strand that looks at the impact of information communication technologies 
(ICTs) in developing countries, focusing mainly on the use of mobile phones and radios. 
In the first strand, most of the studies investigate transaction costs that serve as barriers to farmers in 
entering a market first, and subsequently influence the quantities they trade. Seminal work in this area 
was by Goetz (1992) who investigated the market behaviour of Senegalese grain farmers. Thereafter, 
major contributions came from Key et al. (2000) and Bellemare and Barrett (2006). Using a diﬀerent 
analytical method, they introduced the distinction between proportional and fixed transaction costs. 
Proportional transaction costs are transaction costs that vary with the quantity traded. Often they are 
associated with the unit transport costs or the time required to make a sale. Fixed transaction costs are 
independent of the quantity traded and include the costs of seeking information on prices, costs of 
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setting up a sale transaction and monitoring costs (i.e. costs to ensure that the conditions of an exchange 
are met, for example enforcing the payment schedule). Only a few studies on transaction costs 
investigate their impact on market behaviour at the household level. Vakis et al. (2003) include the 
distinction between fixed and proportional transaction costs in a household framework to study the 
market participation decisions of Peruvian potato farmers. Fafchamps and Hill (2005) investigate why 
many Ugandan coffee growers do not sell their produce at the marketplace but instead wait for an 
itinerant farm gate buyer, resulting in lower profits. More recently, Shilpi and Umali-Deininger (2008) 
studied how market facilities influence marketing decisions of farmers in the Indian state of Tamil 
Nadu. An important obstacle that has limited empirical research on market behaviour is the variable 
and volatile nature of transaction costs which are not easily quantified and are very often not, or only 
partially, captured in surveys. 
The second research strand that this study relates to looks at the impact of the recent diﬀusion in 
developing countries of ICTs, which has rekindled research on the role of transaction costs. The 
rationale is that the usage of mobiles and radios by farmers can potentially reduce fixed transaction 
costs, specifically search costs, and at the same time improve farmers’ bargaining position with direct 
benefits for farm household welfare. The pioneering work of Jensen (2007) showed that the adoption 
of mobile phones amongst fishermen in the Indian state of Kerala was associated with a reduction of 
price dispersion and waste of fish caught. Goyal (2010) demonstrated that the diﬀusion of computer 
terminals providing market information in Central India brought about an increase of 1-3 per cent in the 
wholesale prices compared to areas where no comprehensive information diﬀusion systems were in 
place. Aker (2010) and Aker and Fafchamps (2010) analysed the impact of mobile phones in 
agricultural markets in Niger. The former found that the advent of mobile phones reduced the price 
dispersion of grains between markets by at least 6.5 per cent, while the latter did not find any eﬀect on 
average prices, although it did find a reduction in variation in prices. No evidence of diﬀerences in farm 
gate prices was found, in contrast to the findings of Svensson and Yanagizawa (2009) who found that 
radio use did increase farm gate prices in Uganda. More recently, Fafchamps and Minten (2012) 
conducted a controlled randomized experiment to assess the impact of SMS-based agricultural 
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information in the Indian state of Maharashtra and found no statistically significant average treatment 
eﬀect on the price received by farmers. However, they found evidence that farmers that received price 
information via SMS were less likely to sell at the farm gate and more likely to travel to more distant 
markets. Finally, Lee and Bellemare (2013) analysed data from the Philippines and found evidence that 
the use of mobile phones is associated with higher crop prices received by agricultural producers, but 
only once the intra-household allocation of technology is taken into account. 
This study attempts to contribute to the strand of studies on transaction costs that focus on market 
behaviour of small-scale farmers in developing countries. At the same time it makes use of data on the 
adoption and usage of ICTs to explore how they may affect fixed transaction costs and influence 
marketing decisions. We use a novel dataset that contains very detailed information on 313 sale 
transactions of grains made by 197 small-scale farmers in northern Ghana. The rich dataset allows us 
to explore aspects of transaction costs that often have not been taken into account in previous 
microeconomic studies, such as the actual use of ICTs to seek market information, including the 
combined use of different technologies, the sources of price information, the knowledge of prices in 
diﬀerent markets, and trust amongst agents. Our data at the transaction level allows us to take into 
account the different factors influencing individual transactions, although the cross section nature does 
not allow us to establish the causal impact of ICTs on the choice of marketplace. The nature of the data 
collection exercise meant that use of instrumental variable techniques or propensity score matching that 
could have provided more robust inferences regarding causality were not feasible in our case. We report 
evidence on how ICT use and other factors affecting fixed and proportional transaction costs influence 
decisions to sell at the farm gate or the market and, in the case of the latter, the choice of the specific 
market for sale of produce. 
 
II. The functioning of food markets in northern Ghana 
The study area for this research was the northern part of Ghana, specifically the Northern, Upper West, 
and Upper East regions. The harsh climatic conditions that follow from having only one rainy season 
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in a year, more severe degradation of soil than other parts of the country, and the inadequacy of 
infrastructure that renders transportation time-consuming and diﬃcult, make this the less developed 
part of Ghana. For these reasons, since post-colonial times, the Ghanaian government with the support 
of international funders has implemented various development programmes to reduce the gap with the 
southern regions. Actions have spanned a wide range of areas, from enhancing agricultural productivity 
and infrastructure, to improving health and education. However, the gap compared to southern regions 
is still wide. Seventy per cent of the people in northern Ghana live under the national poverty line and 
three quarters of the households live in rural areas, where most of the inhabitants base their livelihood 
on agriculture, which is their main source of income (GSS, 2008). The eﬃciency of agricultural markets 
is thus a critical means to improve the welfare of producers. 
The study focuses on food crops (cereals and legumes) which are widely grown in the region. Food 
markets in northern Ghana are not regulated, i.e. anyone can access markets and sell produce. In most 
of the communities there is a local market active every fortnight. Producers living in the community 
can sell marketable surplus, and at the beginning of the agricultural season, buy inputs from traders. 
Larger markets are held at the district capital. These usually have better infrastructure than markets in 
the communities and attract more buyers. For these reasons, producers may travel there to trade. 
Regional capitals in each of the northern regions (respectively Tamale, Wa, Bolgatanga) are better 
connected to transport infrastructure and their levels of market activity and trade volumes are larger 
than in district markets. In this setting, the prices at regional markets are higher than in district markets, 
while prices at community markets are the lowest. However, the costs to access farther away markets 
can, of course, be higher. 
Farm gate buyers are important economic actors in the study area. These are traders that travel to the 
farm gate, buy the commodity and re-sell in markets farther from the production regions where they 
may obtain a larger profit. Often they travel from southern regions to northern regions and tend to buy 
after the harvest when prices are lower, and store the commodity until prices rise. Once farm gate buyers 
leave the region, the main buyers during the remaining months of the season tend to be consumers or 
local buyers, who buy small quantities and re-sell within northern markets. 
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III Conceptual Framework 
Our conceptual framework is based on Fafchamps and Hill (2005) as further developed in Shilpi and 
Umali-Deninger (2008). We expand the original model to include fixed and proportional transaction 
costs associated with sale in the market and farm gate sales. Farmers who sell at the farm gate also incur 
some transaction costs – they may need to look for a buyer and in some cases, where the household is 
located away from road access, transport the commodity to a nearby collection point. The inclusion of 
fixed and proportional transaction costs allows us to separate the components that affect the costs of 
participating in a market and identify the role of ICTs. This section is divided into two parts: the first 
covers the decision to sell the produce at the farm gate or take it to the market, while the second part 
models the choice of the market when the farmer opts for a market sale.  
 
A. Sale at the farm gate or the market 
We assume that farmers have the choice to sell their produce at the farm gate or take their produce to a 
market for sale. For a farm gate sale, the 𝑖𝑡ℎ farmer who has a quantity 𝑞𝑖 to sell would receive a unit 
price 𝑝𝑓 and incur associated transaction costs 𝐶𝑖
𝑓
, where 𝑓 denotes that costs are specific to the farm 
gate sale. The total transaction cost 𝐶𝑖
𝑓
 consists of two components – the fixed costs incurred by the 
farmer in setting up the transaction and the proportional costs which are related to the quantity of 
produce transacted. Therefore,  
𝐶𝑖
𝑓 = 𝑎𝑖
𝑓 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑓𝑞𝑖 
where 𝑎𝑖
𝑓
 is the fixed transaction costs and 𝑐𝑖
𝑓
 is the per unit (proportional) transaction cost associated 
with a farm gate sale. For a market sale, the farmer would receive a price of 𝑝𝑚 and incur associated 
transaction costs of 𝐶𝑖
𝑚 which would also consist of a fixed and proportional component such that: 
𝐶𝑖
𝑚 = 𝑎𝑖
𝑚 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑚𝑞𝑖 
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where 𝑎𝑖
𝑚 is the fixed transaction costs and 𝑐𝑖
𝑚 is the per unit (proportional) transaction cost associated 
with a farm gate sale.  
The net revenue for the farm gate sale is:  
𝑝𝑓𝑞𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖
𝑓 = 𝑝𝑓𝑞𝑖 − (𝑎𝑖
𝑓 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑓𝑞𝑖) 
and the net revenue for the market sale is: 
𝑝𝑚𝑞𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖
𝑚 = 𝑝𝑚𝑞𝑖 − (𝑎𝑖
𝑚 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑚𝑞𝑖) 
The difference in net revenue between selling at the market and selling at the farm gate can be denoted 
by 𝐷𝑖: 
𝐷𝑖 = (𝑝
𝑚𝑞𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖
𝑚) − (𝑝𝑓𝑞𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖
𝑓) = 𝑞𝑖[(𝑝
𝑚 − 𝑝𝑓) − (𝑐𝑖
𝑚 − 𝑐𝑖
𝑓)] − (𝑎𝑖
𝑚 − 𝑎𝑖
𝑓) 
The farmer will choose to sell at the market if 𝐷𝑖 > 0 and at the farm gate otherwise.  
Following Fafchamps and Hill (2005) and Shilpi and Umali-Deninger (2005) we assume that farm gate 
buyers are itinerant traders who also incur fixed and proportional transaction costs 𝐶𝑏 to set up the 
transaction and transport and sell the produce in the market. For the 𝑗𝑡ℎ buyer:  
𝐶𝑗
𝑏 = 𝑎𝑗𝑖
𝑏 + 𝑐𝑗
𝑏𝑞𝑖 
where 𝑎𝑗𝑖
𝑏  denotes the fixed transaction costs incurred by the buyer. The 𝑖 subscript denotes the farm 
household and as explained later, we assume that the fixed transaction costs faced by the buyer are 
specific to the farm household. If we assume free entry into itinerant trading, then in equilibrium: 
𝑝𝑓𝑞𝑖 = 𝑝
𝑚𝑞𝑖 − 𝐶𝑗
𝑏. 
Therefore, the expression for 𝐷𝑖 becomes: 
𝐷𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖[(𝑐𝑗
𝑏 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑓
) −  𝑐𝑖
𝑚] − (𝑎𝑖
𝑚 − (𝑎𝑖
𝑓 + 𝑎𝑗𝑖
𝑏 ). 
The farmer’s decision to sell at the farm gate or at the market depends on the fixed and proportional 
transaction costs faced by the farmer and the farm gate buyer. We will observe a market sale if 𝐷𝑖 > 0 
and the farmer’s choice can be modelled as a binary decision (𝑦1) such that: 
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𝑦1 = [
1    𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝐷𝑖 + 𝑢 ≥ 0
0   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                 
 
where 𝑢 is the error term. In our data set we do not observe the transaction costs faced by the farm gate 
buyers. To derive the empirical specification we make two assumptions regarding the transaction costs 
faced by farm gate buyers. First we assume that the proportional transaction costs faced by all the farm 
gate buyers (itinerant traders) are the same. This can arise in a situation where all the itinerant traders 
use the same type of transport and incur the same per unit costs of transporting the produce to the 
market. Second, we assume that itinerant traders are a relatively homogenous group (in terms of scale 
of operations and infrastructure) and that the fixed transaction costs incurred by them are largely 
determined by the characteristics of the farm household. For instance, the fixed costs of identifying a 
potential transaction and setting it up may be lower when the buyer deals with a farm household with a 
large farm holding that consistently produces surpluses for sale compared to small households that only 
occasionally produce surpluses for sale. Similarly, the costs of setting up a transaction may be lower 
for the buyer when dealing with a farmer who is reachable by mobile phone or is located close to road 
access. Based on these assumptions, we use an empirical specification for the farmer’s decision to sell 
at the farm gate or at the market based on the seller’s characteristics and transaction costs: 
𝑦
1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽
1
𝑄 + 𝛽
2
𝑊 + 𝛽
3
𝑷𝑻𝑪 + 𝛽
4
𝑭𝑻𝑪 + 𝛽
5
𝒁 + 𝑢    (1) 
where 𝑄 is the quantity sold, 𝑊 is the wealth of the household, 𝑷𝑻𝑪 and 𝑭𝑻𝑪 are vector of proportional 
and fixed transaction costs for the seller respectively, and 𝒁 is a vector of household characteristics. We 
adopt a linear probability model to estimate the latent variable (𝐷𝑖
∗).1 
We can now review the determinants affecting the choice of marketplace. The availability of large 
quantities to sell could induce the farm producer to sell at the farm gate or at the market – the effect on 
the choice of the place of sale is ambiguous because a number of opposing considerations are involved. 
Sales of large quantities can reduce unit transaction costs and, therefore, may incline sellers to travel to 
markets (Fafchamps and Hill, 2005). However in most communities of Northern Ghana access to 
transportation (trucks) is seldom available to farmers and multiple trips to the market with a cart may 
not be convenient. Additionally, public transport, of formal and informal nature, is irregular. Thus the 
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local setting may contribute to different marketplace choices than typically found in previous studies. 
Moreover, large quantities increase bargaining power and may attract farm gate buyers. Owning 
vehicles suitable to transport large quantities, farm gate buyers may be able to reduce fixed 
transportation costs by procuring larger quantities from a few sellers. 
Fafchamps and Hill (2005) suggest that wealthier households are more likely to wait for a farm gate 
buyer. The rationale is that they have a higher shadow cost of labour and means to enjoy leisure time. 
Wealth could also be a signal for farm gate buyers to recruit sellers, since wealthier farmers are likely 
to produces surpluses for sale. However, wealthier farmers may also have access to better transport, 
which may facilitate better access to markets. Therefore, the impact of higher household wealth on the 
likelihood of a farm gate sale or sale at the marketplace is difficult to predict.  
Factors that influence proportional transaction costs are the distance to the market, the quality of 
transportation and market infrastructure, the number of transactions conducted, and ownership of 
transport means. Distance to the nearest market has been widely used in the literature on farm household 
market behaviour (Goetz, 1992; Key et al., 2000; Fafchamps and Hill 2005; Bellemare and Barrett, 
2006) as a determinant of transaction costs, while the quality of the road has been used as a proxy for 
the overall quality of infrastructure. We can expect sellers living closer to the market to take advantage 
of market facilities, especially where infrastructure is better. However, farm gate buyers may not be 
prepared to travel to farther away areas, and this may force remote households to travel to markets. 
Finally, ownership of vehicles such as bicycles may allow farmers to more easily reach the market and 
influence the per unit transportation costs of the seller. 
Unlike proportional transaction costs, fixed transaction costs are independent of the quantity sold. They 
include costs of obtaining information on prices in diﬀerent markets, searching for buyers and setting 
up or negotiating transactions. These costs may be influenced by the technology and sources of 
information available to the seller and certain characteristics of the seller (e.g., negotiating ability). 
Given the nature of ICTs, we expect their use to mainly influence the choice of marketplace through 
their impact on fixed transaction costs. Radios and mobiles may influence transaction costs and 
marketplace choice via different mechanisms. Radios can be used to get information on prices which 
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may help farm producers’ decision on when and where to trade and possibly strengthen bargaining 
power, while mobile phones could lower search costs to find buyers. Equally, using mobile phones, 
buyers can reach potential sellers and reduce their fixed transaction costs. Other seller characteristics 
may also determine the choice of the marketplace. The choice of the marketplace may depend on 
whether the male head of the household or the female spouse handles the sale transaction, since 
traditionally women are considered to be the main actors in Ghanaian agricultural markets (Boserup et 
al., 2007). Relationships between sellers and buyers are also important factors in market transactions. 
We, therefore, include in the model a variable that aims to capture the trust between the two actors. 
Crop quality may also influence fixed transaction costs – lower crop quality may increase the cost of 
locating a buyer willing to accept the produce offered. This cost could differ across markets and 
influence the choice of the place of sale.   
Finally, we control for household characteristics ( 𝐙 ), such as the age of the head, household 
composition, level of education, the crop sold and regional dummies. 
 
B. Choosing the marketplace 
Farmers that decide to sell at the market face a choice regarding which marketplace to travel to. More 
distant markets may have better infrastructure, more buyers, and potentially higher profits; reasons that 
can urge households to transport their products to be sold there (Shilpi and Umali-Deininger; 2008). 
However, that would increase proportional transaction costs and possibly information on prices may 
not be reliable adding uncertainty and risk to the transaction. Let us consider an additional market, 𝑛, 
with potentially better infrastructure and more buyers than market 𝑚, and located farther away from the 
farm household. In case no farm gate buyers are available or the seller reckons s/he can get a better 
price bringing the commodity to a marketplace, the farm household will face the following trade oﬀ 
𝑝𝑚𝑞𝑖 − (𝑎𝑖
𝑚 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑚𝑞𝑖) ⋛ 𝑝
𝑛𝑞𝑖 − (𝑎𝑖
𝑛 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑛𝑞𝑖) 
in which the proportional transaction costs associated with a sale at the market closer to the production 
site are lower than with the sale at a more distant market (𝑐𝑖
𝑚 < 𝑐𝑖
𝑛), as are the fixed transaction costs 
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(𝑎𝑖
𝑚 < 𝑎𝑖
𝑛) . The decision to travel to the more distant market will then depend on the diﬀerent 
magnitudes of proportional and fixed transaction costs, and the expected price in each market. 
Specifically, the difference (𝐷𝑖) in the total net revenues from selling at the market 𝑚  and 𝑛  will 
determine the choice of marketplace:  
𝐷𝑖 = [𝑝
𝑚𝑞𝑖 − (𝑎𝑖
𝑚 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑚𝑞𝑖)] − [𝑝
𝑛𝑞𝑖 − (𝑎𝑖
𝑛 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑛𝑞𝑖)]. 
When 𝐷𝑖 > 0 the farmer will travel to market 𝑚, otherwise to the market 𝑛. 
Because of its administrative units, in northern Ghana small-scale farmers can choose to sell their 
produce (ordered from the closer to the farther away market) at the community market (𝑚), in the 
district capital (𝑛), or at the regional market (𝑧). Expanding Eq. 2 to include a farther away market (𝑧), 
the choice of marketplace is represented by an ordinal variable (𝑦2) such that 
𝑦2 =
[
1   𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝐷𝑖 + 𝑢 = [𝑝
𝑚𝑞𝑖 − (𝑎𝑖
𝑚 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑚𝑞𝑖)] > [𝑝
𝑛𝑞𝑖 − (𝑎𝑖
𝑛 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑛𝑞𝑖)] ≥ [𝑝
𝑧𝑞𝑖 − (𝑎𝑖
𝑧 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑧𝑞𝑖)]
2   𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝐷𝑖 + 𝑢 = [𝑝
𝑛𝑞𝑖 − (𝑎𝑖
𝑛 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑛𝑞𝑖)] > [𝑝
𝑚𝑞𝑖 − (𝑎𝑖
𝑚 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑚𝑞𝑖)] ≥ [𝑝
𝑧𝑞𝑖 − (𝑎𝑖
𝑧 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑧𝑞𝑖)]
3   𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝐷𝑖 + 𝑢 = [𝑝
𝑧𝑞𝑖 − (𝑎𝑖
𝑧 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑧𝑞𝑖)] > [𝑝
𝑚𝑞𝑖 − (𝑎𝑖
𝑚 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑚𝑞𝑖)] ≥ [𝑝
𝑛𝑞𝑖 − (𝑎𝑖
𝑛 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑛𝑞𝑖)]
, 
where 𝐷𝑖
∗ is a latent variable estimated with an ordered probit.2 The econometric specification is in 
common with Eq. 1., such that: 
𝑦2 = 𝑓(𝑄, 𝑊, 𝑷𝑻𝑪, 𝑭𝑻𝑪, 𝒁) + 𝑢     (2) 
Equation (2) shares most of the variables with (1). Again the role of quantity traded and wealth in the 
choice of the marketplace may be mixed. Larger quantities may be transported to farther away markets 
where prices are higher, but the costs associated with the transaction may be higher as well. As in the 
choice between a sale at the farm gate or at the market, the effect of wealth may operate in opposing 
directions. Wealthier households may prefer leisure time and therefore choose a closer market for a 
quicker transaction. However, they may also own vehicles which allows them to travel to farther away 
markets compared to poorer households. In fact the role of transportation has had a predominant role in 
the literature on market participation (Goetz, 1992; Key et al., 2000; Fafchamps and Hill 2005) and we 
expect the ownership of bicycles to be associated with travel to more distant markets.  
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ICT use may influence the choice of marketplace in a number of different ways. Some sellers may use 
the market information to reinforce their bargaining power in closer markets, others may be pushed to 
travel to farther markets where the returns can be higher (Aker, 2010). However, the choice of 
marketplace will also be based on the expected price and seller may travel to farther markets if they are 
certain of the return from the transaction. Equally, trusted buyers may reduce the uncertainty of a 
transaction in a larger market and push sellers to travel longer distances. 
We carried out the analysis at the level of individual transactions, which means that household 
characteristics and wealth are in the nature of fixed eﬀects and remain the same across diﬀerent 
transactions made by a household. As a consequence, in the econometric estimation of both models, the 
standard errors are clustered at the household level. 
 
IV. The Data 
An important aspect of the data used in this study is the availability of detailed information on individual 
sale transactions that is seldom available in other household surveys. The data include the extent of 
market information available with each seller, the use of ICTs to gather market information, and the 
characteristics of the sale (place, transport means, who bargained the sale and how much the buyer was 
trusted). We collected primary data in northern Ghana on all sale transactions (313) of 197 households 
in the agricultural season 2008-2009. We used multi-stage sampling, where we selected three districts 
in the northern regions of Ghana (Lawra in Upper West, Bongo in Upper East and Bunkpurugu-Yunyoo 
in Northern region), and within each district five communities were selected and thirty random 
households surveyed in each community. 
For this analysis we focus on the marketing of cereals (maize, sorghum/millet, rice) and legumes 
(cowpea and groundnut), which are the main food crops in the region. Due to their common 
characteristics including non-perishability, transaction costs for marketing these crops are likely to be 
similar which makes market transactions in these crops comparable. However, in order to control for 
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sources of unobserved heterogeneity in marketing behaviour related to diﬀerent crops, we included crop 
dummies in each model. 
The choice of the variables included in the models directly derives from the theoretical framework and 
Vakis et al. (2003). Extending the approach adopted in Vakis et al (2003), and as an innovative element 
in this study, we include several variables to capture the role of ICTs and diﬀerent sources of 
information in influencing market participation behaviour via their effects on transaction costs. The 
proportional transaction costs are captured with the distance to the market, the means of transport, and 
the status of roads. The determinants of fixed transaction costs include sources of information accessed 
and ICT use, whether the spouse of the head of the household conducted the negotiation, the trust with 
respect to the buyer, and the extent of market information available to the seller at the time of the sale. 
The descriptive statistics of the household characteristics and sale transactions are reported in Tables 
A1 and A2 respectively in online Appendix. On average each household made two transactions, which 
involved slightly less than 400 kilograms of a commodity. The majority of the transactions were made 
at the market (84%), to which farm households travelled on average around 10 kilometres.3 Out of all 
the transactions at the market, 68 per cent were made in the community market, 26 per cent in the district 
market, and the remainder in the regional capital. As a proxy for the availability of good infrastructure, 
we used the self-reported status of the roads to the local market. The vast majority of transactions were 
made in conditions of poor infrastructure, and only twenty per cent benefitted from good roads. A 
quarter of the transactions were negotiated by the female spouse alone. In the sample, most of the 
transactions occurred in a situation where the seller trusted the buyer. 
In most of the transactions, sellers knew in advance the price prevalent in the market where the sale was 
made (60%) and on average at the time of the sale they had price information from more than one 
market. For each transaction we captured the use of ICTs to gather market information and the sources 
of information accessed. Radios and mobile phones were the main ICTs in the region (used respectively 
in 59 and 56 per cent of the households). In 33% of the transactions, sellers used mobile phones to 
gather market information, compared to 16 per cent that received market information from the radios 
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and 38 per cent that obtained market information based on discussion with the informants (“word of 
mouth”). The government does air a weekly price bulletin in local languages broadcast via radio 
throughout the country. It covers market price information of outputs and (in the production season) 
inputs in the markets in the regional and districts capitals in which it is aired. The main sources of 
market information were neighbours (62%), followed by the extension oﬃcers (46%). 
 
V. Results 
A. Correction for Potential Endogeneity in the Models 
Empirically, we have reasons to think the quantity traded could be endogenous to the choice of market. 
For example, farmers may decide to sell small quantities at the farm gate or closer markets, and larger 
quantities in distant markets (or vice versa). Similarly to Fafchamps and Hill (2005), we chose as 
instruments land characteristics of the crop sold: we have no reason to think that the plot size has an 
eﬀect on the marketing decisions, except through the size of the harvest. In both models we tested 
whether the quantity traded was exogenous (Durbin-Wu-Hausman test), checked that the instrument 
chosen was not weak (5% distortion from Wald test based on Stock and Yogo significance levels), and 
jointly estimated the model and the instrumental regression based on maximum likelihood. In the model 
of choice between selling at the farm gate or at the market we rejected the hypothesis of exogeneity of 
the quantity traded (ρ = 0.02) and the chosen instrument proved to be strong (F =24.82, ρ = 0.00, Stock 
and Yogo=16.38). In the case of modelling which marketplace sellers choose to travel to, we failed to 
reject the exogeneity of the quantity traded (ρ = 0.70).4 
It could also be argued that the use of ICTs to gather market information may be determined by the 
choice of market, confounding attempts to identify causation. Although we cannot definitely rule this 
out, anecdotal evidence from the qualitative research that accompanied our household survey suggested 
that price search may not pose a major endogeneity problem for the equations being estimated. Focus 
groups with farmers revealed that the vast majority of farmers have some sort of market information 
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(none of the households in the dataset used is autarkic), and our data show that almost 80 per cent of 
transactions have been made with prior market information. Insights from the focus groups suggest that 
farm households do not gather price information on a specific market once they decide to sell their 
produce there. Rather, they are interested in learning about price differences across markets, to help 
them decide where the return from the sale is likely to be higher after factoring in transactions costs.  
There is also no systematic association in the data between the place of sale chosen by a farmer and the 
specific source of price information or type of ICT used.  All the three transmission technologies (radios, 
mobile phones and “word of mouth”) are relevant for gathering information from a range of markets. 
The only exception is market price in community markets, which is not available via radio. Radios and 
mobile phones may be used in different ways in making marketing decisions – radios may provide 
information on broader price trends, while the two-way communication facilitated by mobile phones 
may be more useful for locating buyers, setting up transactions and negotiating prices. Nevertheless, 
we have no evidence that the use of a specific technology is driven by the choice of marketplace.5 This 
also applies to different sources of information.  
 
B. Selling at the farm gate or at the market 
Coeﬃcients of the linear probability model are reported in Table 1. A significant factor that drives the 
market relationship between farmers and the itinerant farm gate buyer is the quantity traded. Farm gate 
buyers travelling from community to community looking for crops to buy have high fixed transaction 
costs: bargaining and monitoring costs can be very high. As a consequence, to realise larger profits, 
they may seek sellers oﬀering larger quantities. A 10% increase in the quantum of produce offered for 
sale increases the probability the sale occurs at the farm gate by 0.02. This is not a negligible increase, 
given that at the baseline the probability of selling at farm gate is 0.16, and given the very large variation 
in quantity sold in the sample.6 It is worth noting that the effect of quantity traded on marketing 
decisions appears to vary across country/institutional settings. A study of market transactions amongst 
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coﬀee growers in Uganda (Fafchamps and Hill; 2005) found that sellers of larger quantities were more 
likely to sell at the market instead of waiting for a farm gate buyer. 
[Table 1 about here] 
We find that remote farm households (furthest from local markets) are more likely to travel to the 
market. This may be the consequence of farm gate buyers not being prepared to travel to remote areas 
for which they may have to incur higher proportional transaction costs. Availability of infrastructure is 
also a critical factor that allows farmers to transport their produce with less effort and participate in 
markets (Shilpi and Umali-Deininger, 2008). As a proxy for availability of infrastructure we used the 
self-reported quality of the road to the market. Better roads indeed encourage farm households to sell 
to the market, a good quality road significantly increases the probability of trading at the market by 0.1, 
which is not negligible given the baseline probability of 0.84. Sale transactions negotiated by the female 
spouse in the household were more likely to occur at the market, confirming the pivotal role of women 
in the agricultural markets in Ghana (Boserup et al., 2007). 
Broader market information, i.e., knowledge of prices in more markets, appears to push farmers to sell 
at the market. Prices in more distant markets at the district or regional level are generally higher and 
information on prices in these markets may persuade farmers that potential returns from transacting in 
some of these markets may be greater than that from farm gate sales even after factoring in higher 
proportional transaction costs. Knowledge of prices from more markets significantly increases the 
likelihood a household sells at the market by 0.12. This is a notable increase, given that at the baseline, 
probability of selling at the market is 0.84. Information sourced from extension officers appears to make 
the farmer more likely to sell at the market. Of the ICT variables, only the use of mobile phone alone is 
(weakly) significantly associated with an increased likelihood of farm gate sales. Two-way 
communication permitted by mobile phone use does not just allow the receipt of updated price 
information but also enables interaction with the informant and possibly aﬀords better opportunity to 
negotiate the terms of the sale over the phone with the buyer. This is more likely our case, where most 
of the communications are carried out via voice. Using mobile phones can thus reduce fixed transaction 
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costs for both the seller and the farm gate buyer, and in our case study significantly increases by 0.14 
the likelihood that the sale takes place at the farm gate. Given the baseline probability of selling at farm 
gate is 0.16, ceteris paribus the use of mobile to gather market information has a marginal economic 
importance. This finding is at variance with Fafchamps and Minten (2012), who found that receiving 
SMS-Based agricultural information pushes Indian farmers to sell at more distant wholesale market and 
less likely to sell at the farm gate. Our finding suggests that the information received via mobile phone 
is not used by sellers to arbitrage across sales outlets, instead supports the view that market information 
is used by farmers to negotiate better prices with farm gate buyers. 
We also attempted to explore the impact of using the combined use of radio and mobile phone to gather 
market information on the farm gate versus market choice. The results are reported in in the second 
column (2) in Table 3. The use of radios and mobile phones together has a highly significant association 
with increased likelihood of market sales – in sharp contrast to the effect of the individual use of radio 
and mobile phones noted above. This result suggests that there are strong complementarities in the use 
of the two technologies. Market price information obtained through radio may be verified through the 
use of mobile phones improving the reliability of information. Simultaneously, mobile phones may 
make it possible for farmers to act on the information received and instigate contacts with buyers in 
specific markets. It must, however, be noted that the combined use of radio and mobile phones was 
observed in only eight per cent of transactions (n=25) and most of these were associated with sale at 
the market. A larger sample is needed to provide more robust estimates. 
As robustness check, we estimated the same specifications with a probit model. The coeﬃcients of the 
linear probability model are consistent with the marginal effects of the probit model (online Appendix 
Table A3) 
 
C. Choosing the marketplace 
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In case no farm gate buyers are available, or if expected prices are higher at the marketplace, the sellers 
face making a decision regarding which market to travel to - community, district capital, regional capital 
or farther (i.e. other regional markets).7 The model estimates are reported in Table 4. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Consistent with our expectations, bicycle ownership is associated with travel to farther markets, 
decreasing the probability of selling at the community market by 0.30, and with a substantial increase 
in the likelihood of selling at the district market (0.17). Given that the baseline probability of selling at 
the community market is 0.68, the ownership of a bicycle has a notable impact in empowering farmers 
to travel to further markets. We find no evidence that ICT use encourages farmers to travel to more 
distant markets. Sellers receiving market information through radio are more likely to sell at the closer 
community market. This suggests that information about market prices in more distant markets may not 
always induce farmers to participate in those markets. They may instead use that information to improve 
their bargaining power in negotiating prices in closer markets. The effects of receiving information 
through mobile phones are similar to that of radio use (but the co-efficient is not significant). We also 
examined the effects of the combined use of radio and mobile phone on the choice of market by 
introducing a dummy variable capturing the combined use; the co-efficient was not significant and other 
coefficients are largely unaffected (results in online Appendix Table A4). 
When market information is sourced from extension agents, sellers are more likely to travel to farther 
away markets.8 This may be related to the perceived reliability of information provided by extension 
agents. If farmers trust the information sourced from extension agents, they may be more willing to 
incur higher proportional transaction costs in pursuit of higher returns in more distant markets. Trust in 
the buyer reduces the uncertainty associated with the transaction outcomes and can reduce 
screening/monitoring costs and the risk of default. Our results show that trust in the buyer induces 
farmers to travel to more distant markets. Crop quality that is below the average quality induces farmers 
to sell in closer (community) markets. Farmers with poor quality of produce to sell may not find it 
worthwhile to incur the increased proportional transaction costs of transporting it to the district or 
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regional markets. Finally, at variance with the behaviour of coffee producers in Uganda reported by 
Fafchamps and Hill (2005), we did not find evidence that wealthier farmers exhibit different behaviour 
in the choice of market. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
We have explored some aspects of household market participation behaviour in developing countries 
that have so far not received much attention in the literature. Market participation decisions are strategic 
for small-scale farmers and they can have a remarkable impact on the welfare of the households, 
expanding their choice sets. Our analysis was possible thanks to a novel dataset containing detailed 
information on sale transactions of grains made by farmers from northern Ghana and their use of ICTs 
to gather market information.  
We find that larger quantity transactions are associated with farm gate sales, which may be attributable 
to lower (per unit) fixed transaction costs incurred by farm buyers when larger quantities are procured 
at the farm gate. This is at variance with the results from some previous studies of cash crop marketing, 
such as Fafchamps and Hill (2005) for coffee growers in Uganda. These differences in findings suggest 
that market participation behaviour may be significantly influenced by country and institutional 
settings. An important addition to the current literature on the usage of ICTs is some evidence (albeit 
weakly significant) for an impact of mobile phones (possibly through reduction in the search costs for 
both sellers and buyers) facilitating transactions at farm gate, with potential benefit for both actors.  
We also attempted to explore the impact of using mobile phones and radios in combination to gather 
market information. Results showed the complementary and the reinforcing effect of the use of the two 
ICTs, which is associated with an increase of sale at the market. Possibly the use of radio is used to 
gather updated and regular market information in nearby markets and the mobile is used to confirm 
prices or look for a buyer in a certain market. However a larger sample of households that use both 
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technologies is needed to provide more robust estimates. Given the policy relevance of the potential 
impact deriving from the use of different technologies, further research is needed in this area. 
Further, we find that in cases where farm producers decide to sell their produce at the market, the use 
of ICTs is not systematically associated with sale in more distant markets. This suggests that the 
principal effect of ICT use on market participation may not necessarily be through encouragement to 
farm producers to travel to more distant markets. ICT use may influence the choice of market by (1) 
providing a broader knowledge of prices in different markets, increasing the bargaining power of farm 
producers in closer markets; and (2) reducing the transaction costs associated with locating a buyer and 
setting up and negotiating a transaction in particular markets. Programmes to disseminate market 
information to small farm producers aimed at enhancing market participation need to be based on a 
clear understanding of how ICT use can affect transaction costs in specific settings and how information 
obtained through the use of different transmission technologies is likely to be used in marketing 
decisions.  
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Notes 
1. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for having pointed out how in this setting a probit model may give 
inconsistent results when instrumental variables are used to address the potential endogeneity of explanatory variables. 
2. Instead of modelling as an ordered model, in some situations a truncated model of the distance travelled by the 
sellers to reach the sale point could be used (see Fafchamps and Hill; 2005). As in our case the distance travelled to 
reach a market varies by district and region, a similar approach would not be informative (e.g. the distance to reach a 
district market in the region A could have been the same distance needed to reach a community district in the region 
B). 
3. Note that not all farm gate sales are physically made at the farm gate (i.e. the seller did not incur in any transport 
cost). In some cases (26 per cent of the farm gate sales), farmers had to transport their products to a point where a 
farm gate buyer collected the commodity (on average they travelled 450 meters). 
4. As a robustness check we also estimated the model instrumenting the quantity traded. Results of the IV and non IV 
approach were nearly identical. 
5. The ownership of the ICTs is not a reliable proxy either, since the ownership is not associated with a specific use 
and therefore would not be informative (Zanello, 2012). 
6. The distribution of quintiles of quantity traded shows a similar pattern for farm gate and market sales, with lower 
quantities of produce relatively more frequently sold at farm gate (Graph A1 in the Appendix). 
7. Since in this case we are modelling only the transactions processed at the market (262 out of 313 transactions), it 
could be argued that a selectivity issue is in place. As a robustness check, we jointly run the initial probit modelling 
the choice to sell at farm gate or at the market with the ordered probit on the marketplace choices and the ρ (the 
correlation parameter between the first and second stage) is highly insignificant (p =0.962). We then conclude that the 
selection is due to observable factors. 
8. The results of the previous model suggest that sourcing information from extension officers is associated with 
greater likelihood of market sale. It is possible that extension officers are more likely to visit more remote areas where 
there are few farm gate buyers, and this may account for the association of market sales. However, here we find that 
information sourced from extension officers pushes farmers to travel to further away markets rather than selling in the 
closest available markets. 
  
23 
References 
Aker, J. C. (2010). Information from markets near and far: Mobile phones and agricultural markets in Niger, American 
Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2(3): 46–59. 
Aker, J. and Fafchamps, M. (2014). How does mobile phone coverage affect farm-gate prices? Evidence from West 
Africa. Forthcoming in World Bank Economic Review. 
Bellemare, M. and Barrett, C. B. (2006). An ordered tobit model of market participation: Evidence from Kenya and 
Ethiopia, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 88-: 324–337. 
Boserup, E., Tan, S. F., and Toulmin, C. (2007). Woman’s role in economic development, Earthscan, New York. 
de Janvry, A., Fafchamps, M. and Sadoulet, E. (1991). Peasant household behaviour with missing markets: Some 
paradoxes explained, The Economic Journal 101: 1400– 1417. 
de Janvry, A. and Sadoulet, E. (2006). Progress in the modeling of rural households’ behavior under market failures, 
Springer, New York. 
Fafchamps, M. (2004). Market institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Theory and evidence, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Fafchamps, M. and Hill, R. (2005). Selling at the farm gate or traveling to market, American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 87: 717–734. 
Fafchamps, M. and Minten, B. (2012). Impact of SMS-based agricultural information on Indian farmers, The World 
Bank Economic Review 26 (2): 1-32. 
Goetz, S. J. (1992). A selectivity model of household food marketing behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa, American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 74: 444–452. 
Goyal, A. (2010). Information, direct access to farmers, and rural market performance in Central India, American 
Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2(3): 22–45. 
GSS (2008). Ghana Living Standards Survey: Report of the 5th round. Ghana Statistical Service, Accra, Ghana. 
Jensen, R. (2007). The digital provide: Information (technology), market performance, and welfare in the South Indian 
fisheries sector, Quarterly Journal of Economics 122: 879– 924. 
Lee, K. and Bellemare, M. (2013). Look Who's Talking: The impacts of the intrahousehold allocation of mobile 
phones on agricultural prices. Journal of Development Studies, 49: 624-640. 
McIntosh, C. S., & Dorfman, J. H. (1992). Qualitative forecast evaluation: A comparison of two performance 
measures. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 74: 209-214. 
Key, N., Sadoulet, E. and de Janvry, A. (2000). Transactions costs and agricultural household supply response, 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82: 245–259. 
Platteau, J.-P. (1994). Behind the market stage where real societies exist, Journal of Development Studies 30: 753–
817. 
Shilpi, F. and Umali-Deininger, D. (2008). Market facilities and agricultural marketing: Evidence from Tamil Nadu, 
India, Agricultural Economics 39: 281–294. 
Svensson, J. and Yanagizawa, D. (2009). Getting prices right: The impact of the market information service in Uganda, 
Journal of the European Economic Association 7: 435–445. 
Vakis, R., Sadoulet, E. and de Janvry, A. (2003). Measuring transactions costs from observed behaviour: Market 
choices in Peru. CUDARE Working Paper 962. Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of 
California at Berkeley 
Zanello, G. (2012). Mobile phones and radios: Effects on transactions costs and market participation for households 
in northern Ghana, Journal of Agricultural Economics 63: 694–714.  
24 
Table 1: Linear Probability Model: Selling at the farm gate (0) or at the market (1).  
 (1) (2) 
  Coeff. Std. Err.  Coeff. Std. Err. 
Quantity sold (IV log) -0.172** 0.083 -0.176** 0.085 
Wealth 0.17e-4 0.16e-4 0.19e-4 0.17e-4 
Proportional Transaction Costs     
Distance to the local market 0.21e-4* 0.12e-4 0.21e-4* 0.12e-4 
Status road 0.101* 0.06 0.104* 0.059 
Bike ownership 0.135 0.103 0.131 0.102 
Fixed Transaction Costs     
Spouse bargaining -0.123* 0.074 -0.118 0.073 
Trust in buyer -0.064* 0.036 -0.061* 0.036 
Quality 0.112 0.094 0.124 0.096 
Price market sale known -0.059 0.068 -0.053 0.067 
Market prices known 0.123** 0.062 0.125** 0.062 
Receiving market information via mobile phone -0.140* 0.08 -0.232** 0.114 
Receiving market information via radio -0.115 0.105 -0.270* 0.159 
Receiving market information "word of mouth" -0.145 0.11 -0.207 0.126 
Receiving market information via neighbours -0.045 0.08 -0.003 0.085 
Receiving market information via ext. agents 0.151** 0.067 0.165** 0.071 
Receiving market information via mobile + radio   0.257* 0.146 
Constant 1.509*** 0.517 1.513*** 0.521 
Household characteristics YES  YES   
Crop and regional dummies YES  YES   
R-squared 0.015  0.02  
Wald χ2 49.52***  51.08***  
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 5.98**  5.87**  
F-Test on significance of instruments 35.383***   35.383*** 
 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by one, two, and three asterisks, respectively. Standard errors clustered 
at household level. The estimations include (not shown) household characteristics (age, gender and level of education of the head 
of the household, dependency ratio, and wealth) and regional and crop dummies. Stock and Yogo significance levels =16.38. 
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Table 2: Choosing the marketplace: community (C), district (D), or regional market (R) 
  Coeff. Std. Err. M.E. (C) M.E. (D) M.E. (R) 
Quantity sold 0.089 0.139 -0.020 0.002 0.019 
Wealth -0.11e-4 0.86e-5 0.25e-5 -0.20e-5 -0.23e-5 
Proportional Transaction Costs      
Distance to the local market 0.27e-4*** 0.58e-5 -0.63e-5 0.50e-5 0.58e-5 
Status road -0.383 0.303 0.098 -0.027 -0.071 
Bike ownership 0.970** 0.400 -0.301 0.172 0.129 
Fixed Transaction Costs      
Spouse bargaining -0.264 0.373 0.064 -0.013 -0.052 
Trust in buyer 0.571*** 0.213 -0.130 0.010 0.120 
Quality -0.938** 0.424 0.292 -0.168 -0.124 
Receiving market information via mobile phone -0.264 0.397 0.063 -0.010 -0.053 
Receiving market information via radio -0.776* 0.435 0.221 -0.099 -0.122 
Receiving market information "word of mouth" -0.267 0.485 0.063 -0.010 -0.054 
Receiving market information via neighbours -0.468 0.343 0.101 0.004 -0.105 
Receiving market information via ext. agents 0.545* 0.322 -0.125 0.010 0.115 
Household characteristics YES     
Crop and regional dummies YES     
α1 4.983*** 1.428    
α2 7.172*** 1.392    
Log pseudolikelihood -117.19     
Wald χ2 68.17***     
Ratio correct prediction‡ 2.22     
 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by one, two, and three asterisks, respectively. Standard errors clustered 
at household level. The estimations include (not shown) household characteristics (age, gender and level of education of the head 
of the household, dependency ratio, and wealth) and regional and crop dummies.  
‡ The ratio of correct prediction is a measure of goodness of fit. It is computed as the sum of the fraction of zeros correctly predicted 
and the ones correctly predicted (McIntosh and Dorfman, 1992). The model is considered robust if the ratio is greater than one.  
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Online Appendix 
Additional data description 
The descriptive statistics of the household characteristics and sale transactions are reported in Tables A1 
and A2 respectively. On average, the head of the household was over 50 years old with just two years of 
formal education. Most were male, although in Ghana – as in most of Western Africa – the role of women 
in markets is critical. In general, men are responsible for the clearing and preparation of the land while 
women are responsible for planting, weeding, fertilizer application, harvesting, transportation to market 
centres, and marketing of the produce (Boserup et al., 2007). A quarter of the transactions were negotiated 
by the female spouse alone. We expected a higher share since in Ghana women are traditionally considered 
to be more active in agricultural markets than men. Trust is an important component in market transactions 
that derives from a history of successful exchanges. This has been captured asking the sellers how much 
they trusted the buyer in each specific transaction.  
Only ten per cent of the households did not have mobile network coverage in their household location, 
whereas the radio signal covers virtually every part of the country. Generally, mobile phones are owned 
mainly by the younger generation, who are more inclined to adopt new technologies. However they are 
widely shared within the household. In the case of mobile phones, information was transmitted via voice in 
the great majority of cases (98%). At the time of data collection in the study area no programmes of market 
information diffusion via SMS services were being implemented. Therefore, farm households that used 
mobile phones to receive price information privately contacted (or had been contacted by) an informant.  
The average wealth, computed as the value of all the non-land belongings of the household (including the 
depreciated values of livestock, farm equipment, and other household equipment), was GH¢ 1222.58, 
equivalent to GBP 553.83 or US$ 863.15. 
The quintiles distribution of quantity traded at the farmgate and market is shown in Graph A1. 
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics: regional and crop dummies, and household characteristics (n=313) 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Household Characteristics      
Male household head  0.94 0.24 0 1 
Household head age Years 51.22 14.57 24 95 
Adult in the household (15-64) Number 4.44 2.02 1 12 
Household head education Years 2.22 4.22 0 20 
Household head experience of 
farming Years  26.94 15.62 2 74 
Total land Hectares 2.39 1.1 0.4 7.2 
Households wealth GH¢ 1222.58 1559.72 7.4 8995.29 
Regional and crop dummies      
North region  0.43 0.5 0 1 
Upper West region  0.09 0.29 0 1 
Maize  0.24 0.43 0 1 
Sorghum/Millet  0.16 0.37 0 1 
Rice  0.12 0.33 0 1 
Cowpea  0.09 0.28 0 1 
Groundnut unshelled  0.24 0.43 0 1 
 
In case of dummy variable, the unit is not specified. 
28 
Table A2: Descriptive statistics: proportional and ﬁxed transaction costs, instruments (n=313) 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Proportional Transaction Costs      
Ownership of bicycle  0.87 0.34 0 1 
Distance to the local market Meters 3586.1 2452.59 50 9000 
Good status of roads to the market  0.19 0.39 0 1 
Fixed Transaction Costs      
Spouse alone bargained the transaction  0.28 0.45 0 1 
Trust in the buyer 1=Very little 2.26 0.9 1 3 
 2=Little     
 3=Neutral     
 4=Much     
 5=Very much     
Product below average quality  0.09 0.29 0 1 
Market price sale known in advance  0.59 0.49 0 1 
Market prices known Number 1.15 0.61 0 3 
Receiving market information via mobile 
phone 
 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Receiving market information via radio  0.16 0.37 0 1 
Receiving market information via mobile 
phone and radios 
 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Receiving market information via “word of 
mouth” 
 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Receiving market information from 
neighbours 
 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Receiving market information from 
extension agents 
 0.46 0.5 0 1 
Quantity traded, prices and selling locations      
Quantity sold Kilograms 391.11 461.52 8 3500 
Sale at the market  0.84 0.37 0 1 
Market chosen (n=262) 0=Community 
market 
1.38 0.6 1 3 
 1=District market     
 2=Regional market     
Distance travelled to marketplace Meters 9601.28 42977.3 0 450000 
Instrument variable      
Plot size Hectares 0.67 0.47 0.08 3 
 
In case of dummy variable, the unit is not specified. 
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Graph A1: Distribution of quantity traded at the farmgate and market (quintiles). 
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Additional estimations 
Table A3: Probit model: Selling at the farm gate (0) or at the market (1). 
 (1) (2) 
 Coeff. Std. Err.  M.E. Coeff. Std. Err. M.E. 
Quantity sold (IV log) -0.770*** 0.162 -0.184 -0.781*** 0.161 -0.191 
Wealth 0.11e-4 0.06e-4 0.28e-4 0.11e-4 0.06e-4 0.28e-4 
Proportional Transaction Costs       
Distance to the local market 0.09e-4** 0.04e-4 0.03e-4 0.10e-4** 0.05e-4 0.02e-4 
Status road 0.418* 0.236 0.087 0.422* 0.232 0.090 
Bike ownership 0.351 0.31 0.095 0.341 0.308 0.093 
Fixed Transaction Costs        
Spouse bargaining -0.523* 0.273 -0.139 -0.478* 0.265 -0.128 
Trust in buyer -0.300** 0.129 -0.072 -0.285** 0.129 -0.069 
Quality 0.489 0.33 0.094 0.512 0.322 0.100 
Price market sale known -0.204 0.275 -0.048 -0.168 0.269 -0.040 
Market prices known 0.454* 0.251 0.109 0.421* 0.241 0.103 
Receiving market information via mobile 
phone -0.750** 0.348 -0.201 -0.981** 0.397 -0.274 
Receiving market information via radio -0.289 0.408 -0.076 -0.910 0.59 -0.282 
Receiving market information "word of 
mouth" -0.618* 0.371 -0.158 -0.784** 0.398 -0.208 
Receiving market information via 
neighbours -0.190 0.302 -0.045 -0.049 0.3 -0.012 
Receiving market information via ext. 
agents 0.558** 0.226 0.131 0.566** 0.233 0.135 
Receiving market information via mobile 
and radio 
   
1.032 0.659 0.156 
Constant 4.041*** 1.213  3.977*** 1.205  
Household characteristics YES   YES   
Crop and regional dummies YES   YES   
Log-pseudolikelihood -479.78   -478.22   
Wald χ2 133.92***   142.96***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 11.45***   11.66***   
F-Test on significance of instruments 35.38***    35.38***   
Ratio correct prediction‡ 1.26   1.24   
 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by one, two, and three asterisks, respectively. Standard errors clustered 
at household level. The estimations include (not shown) household characteristics (age, gender and level of education of the head 
of the household, dependency ratio, and wealth) and regional and crop dummies. Stock and Yogo significance levels =16.38. 
‡ The ratio of correct prediction is a measure of goodness of fit. It is computed as the sum of the fraction of zeros correctly predicted 
and the ones correctly predicted (McIntosh and Dorfman, 1992). The model is considered robust if the ratio is greater than one. 
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Table A4: Choosing the marketplace: community (C), district (D), or regional market (R) 
  Coeff. Std. Err. M.E. (C) M.E. (D) M.E. (R) 
Quantity sold 0.089 0.137 -0.020 0.002 0.019 
Wealth -0.11e-4 0.86e-5 0.25e-5 -0.20e-5 -0.23e-5 
Proportional Transaction Costs      
Distance to the local market 0.28e-4*** 0.58e-5 -0.64e-5 0.50e-5 0.56e-5 
Status road -0.383 0.302 0.098 -0.027 -0.071 
Bike ownership 0.970** 0.400 -0.301 0.172 0.129 
Fixed Transaction Costs       
Spouse bargaining -0.264 0.372 0.064 -0.013 -0.052 
Trust in buyer 0.571*** 0.213 -0.130 0.010 0.120 
Quality -0.939** 0.424 0.293 -0.168 -0.124 
Receiving market information via mobile phone -0.269 0.439 0.064 -0.010 -0.054 
Receiving market information via radio -0.784 0.637 0.224 -0.101 -0.123 
Receiving market information "word of mouth" -0.270 0.491 0.064 -0.010 -0.054 
Receiving market information via neighbours -0.465 0.349 0.100 0.004 -0.104 
Receiving market information via ext. agents 0.545* 0.321 -0.125 0.010 0.115 
Receiving market information via mobile and 
radio 0.016 0.716 -0.004  0.003 
Household characteristics YES     
Crop and regional dummies YES         
α1 4.983*** 1.419    
α2 7.171*** 1.385       
Log pseudolikelihood 117.19     
Wald χ2 68.47***        
Ratio correct prediction‡ 2.23         
 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by one, two, and three asterisks, respectively. Standard errors clustered 
at household level. The estimations include (not shown) household characteristics (age, gender and level of education of the head 
of the household, dependency ratio, and wealth) and regional and crop dummies. 
‡ The ratio of correct prediction is a measure of goodness of fit. It is computed as the sum of the fraction of zeros correctly predicted 
and the ones correctly predicted (McIntosh and Dorfman, 1992). The model is considered robust if the ratio is greater than one. 
 
